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The army's troops conducted the defensive actively. Several counterthrusts were prepared and carried out. The experience of conducting them showed that the aims of the counterthrusts were achieved more completely in those instances when the necessary time was allocated to prepare for them.

The combat practice of defensive oeprations by the 64th Army at Stalingrad disclosed that with the gradual deployment of the troops it was essential to organize and send forward over significant distances strong forward detachments in the aim of occupying and holding advantageous lines ahead of the main defensive zone. This made it possible to gain time to reinforce the defenses, to cause the enemy losses and force it to deploy its main forces before approaching the main defensive line.

Also instructive is the fact that for countering enemy tanks, in addition to antitank artillery, use was also made of the regimental antiaircraft artillery, a significant portion of the divisional antiaircraft artillery, ground attack aviation, mixed minefields, antitank brigades and Molotov cocktails. However, the insufficient development of the tactical zone as well as the lack in certain instances of troops on the defensive lines located in depth impeded the consistent repelling of enemy infantry and tank attacks on each line. This, naturally, told negatively on the course of the defensive actions by the formations and units of the 64th Army.

As a whole, the formations and units of the 64th Army during the period of the defense of Stalingrad gained valuable experience in conducting defensive operations and this experience was successfully employed by the Soviet troops in the further course of the war.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Stalingrad Front was set up on 12 July 1942. The commanders of the front were: Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko from 12 July, Lt Gen V. N. Gordov from 23 July and Col Gen A. I. Yeremenko from 13 August.

2 [Not in report.]

3 TsAMO [Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense], folio 341, inv. 6217, file 145, sheet 21.

4 Ibid., folio 342, inv. 5312, file 9, sheets 62, 63.

5 "Velikaya pobeda na Volge" [The Great Victory on the Volga], Voyenizdat, 1965, p 85.

6 Quoted from the book by A. M. Samsonov, "Stalingradskaya bitva" [The Stalingrad Battle], Moscow, Nauka, 1968, p 120.

7 [Not in report.]

8 TsAMO, folio 341, inv. 5312, file 45, sheet 5.

9 Ibid., sheet 14.

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ROLE OF MILITARY STRATEGY IN PREPARING A COUNTRY FOR WAR

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[Article, title as above and "Based on the Experience of World War I and World War II," by Candidate of Military Sciences, Maj Gen L. Korzun]

[Text] In Soviet military art, by military strategy which is the highest area of this art, one understands that component part which encompasses the theory and practice of readying a nation and its armed forces for a war, the planning and conduct of the war and the strategic operations. Among other problems, military strategy, as a system of scientific knowledge, works out the theoretical bases of the planning, preparation and conduct of a war, while in the area of practical activity it is concerned with the elaboration and implementation of measures to prepare both the armed forces as well as the theaters of military operations, the nation's economy and population for the war.[1]

Thus, the elaboration of the theoretical bases and the practical activities to ready a nation for war is one of the most important functions of military strategy. To a significant degree, the success of the course and outcome of a war depends upon its solution. In this regard a study and analysis of the experience of strategy's involvement in the preparation of the world's major states for World Wars I and II and the disclosure of definite trends and directions in this area are of undoubted theoretical and practical interest.

A definite involvement of strategy in the preparation of any state for a war has occurred since its appearance, that is, with the rise of wars and armies. Here over a long historical period, both the significance and scale of the very preparations of a nation for war as well as the degree of strategy's involvement in this were comparatively restricted, although these were constantly rising. Their role and scale began to increase more quickly and significantly in the 19th Century, particularly with the entry of capitalism into the stage of imperialism, in keeping with the sharp quantitative and qualitative development of weaponry and the transition to mass armies.

However, regardless of the obvious existence and constant development of strategy's function in the preparation of a nation for war, for a long time strategy was not put by military theory into an independent category and, in essence, was concealed behind the general formula of strategy's involvement in the "preparation of a war." As strategy became more concrete, it still, as a rule,

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was reduced at best to the preparation of the theaters of military operations or remained within the confines of the preparation of the armed forces. Even in articles devoted to military strategy in all three editions of the "Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], the role of military strategy in essence was restricted to the preparation of the armed forces for a war. However, military art has developed continuously. "The development of military art," pointed out the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "represents an ongoing and complex process encompassing all its parts.... The scope of strategy has been increasing and the contents of its tasks have become more complex."[2]

The necessity of preparing a state for war, the increased significance of this task and the strengthening of strategy's role in carrying it out are determined by many factors and primarily by the very close reciprocal link between strategy, politics and the economy. This linkage was first disclosed and very clearly defined by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. F. Engels from the positions of materialistic dialectics directly pointed out that "an act of violence...is a political act." He pointed to the dependence of strategy upon the level of production achieved at a given moment and that "all the organization of armies and the methods of conducting combat employed by them and at the same time the victories and defeats are dependent upon the material, that is, the economic conditions: upon the human material and upon the weapons and, consequently, upon the quality and quantity of the population and upon technology."[3]

V. I. Lenin emphasized that "strategy is subordinate to policy and both are inseparably interlinked."[4] This Leninist thesis has been convincingly confirmed by the experience of World Wars I and II. In preparing for them and in the course of armed combat, policy set the goals of the opposing coalitions and each individual nation involved in them, the methods of preparing and conducting the war, it set for strategy specific tasks and endeavored to create the best conditions for carrying them out. But policy itself utilized the ideas and conclusions of military strategy in relation to the probable nature, scope and duration of the forthcoming wars, the most effective methods of conducting them, the military-strategic estimates of the situation in the world as a whole and in the probable enemy states as well as the recommendations on the best preparations to achieve the set political goals in the course of the war and so forth.

Before World War I, German imperialism set the overall political goal of achieving a reapportionment of the already divided world, winning away colonies from its basic imperialist rivals and establishing its own rule in them. The nature and content of this political goal determined the essence of the demands on military strategy. These were disclosed by F. Engels who in 1887 wrote that "for Prussia--Germany, at present any other war but a world war is impossible. This would be a universal war of previously unprecedented scope and unprecedented force."[5] Then he gave an amazingly accurate prediction of the nature, scope and outcome of a war which commenced 27 years later. Such was the strength of his irreproachably class analysis, in the expression of V. I. Lenin.

The particular features of Germany's preparations for war in many ways were determined by the prospect of waging it simultaneously on two fronts. The chief

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of the German General Staff, Field Mar von Moltke, even in 1871 had written that "the most dangerous testing for the existence of the young German Empire would be a simultaneous war against Russia and France and since the possibility of such a combination cannot be excluded, then it is essential ahead of time to take into consideration the means for defense under such conditions."[6]

The German political leadership and the General Staff planned a pre-emptive attack. Here a successive defeat of the enemies in the West and East was considered the most effective. In accord with the von Schlieffen Plan of 1905, the main thrust was to be made initially against France. Several weeks were assigned to carry out this mission after which the major forces were to be shifted from the Western Front against Russia to defeat it.

German preparations for World War I were actually organized and carried out on the basis of this plan. The adventuristic nature underlying the von Schlieffen Plan was ultimately felt in those major miscalculations in the nation's preparations for war and which were disclosed in the course of it. Having greatly miscalculated in estimating the real forces and potential capabilities of the enemies, German strategy defined a future war as short-lived which, having been commenced in the summer, could be completed before the fall.

For carrying out the von Schlieffen Plan it would be essential to have a mass army which possessed significant superiority over the enemy and was prepared for a powerful pre-emptive strike. Since the extended conduct of a war was not anticipated, no provision was made for a major development of mass military production in the course of the war, the shifting of the entire economy to a wartime footing and so forth. Incidentally, an analogous miscalculation was also made by Germany's ally, Austro-Hungary, and by its opponents, England, France and Russia.

Thus, German strategy on the eve of World War I, having been given its tasks by the political leadership and the imperialist monopolies standing behind it, proposed a plan for carrying out these tasks and after its approval determined its needs for preparing the nation for war. Germany endeavored to get a jump on its opponents in the quantitative and qualitative growth of weapons, in training a mass army and in creating conditions for its rapid mobilization. The size of the army grew. From 1874, it doubled in the peacetime ground forces.[8] In response the size of the Russian and French armies also grew.

The Entente states also intended to carry out their tasks in a war by an offensive and carried out the corresponding preparations of the armed forces and the nations. Here France, in counting on the diverting role of a Russian offensive at the outset of the war, in essence, even in the planning of the war surrendered strategic initiative to the enemy. England, considering its main task to be the winning of victory at sea, assigned an auxiliary role to its own ground forces.

Proceeding from the military-political and strategic goals, a campaign was started up for ideologically influencing the armed forces personnel and the entire population. Its essence and role subsequently, in 1921, were very precisely stated by the prominent proletarian military leader and theoretician M. V. Frunze: "The bourgeois class which rules in Germany has subordinated all

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the life of the nation to the basic state goal of victory over competitors. The press, science, art, education and the army--everything is organized and focused by the bourgeoisie on a single spot. The bourgeoisie has succeeded in distorting and subordinating even significant strata of the German proletariat to its influence.... On this basis, in this atmosphere of universal obedience to the Army and Navy and on the basis of a more active foreign policy which has given the army definitely offensive tasks, no other German military doctrine could be created except for the one we see at present. In the personnel of the General Staff and the entire German Army...better than anywhere else is reflected the entire Germany of the complacent bourgeoisie and landowners confident of their strength and lulled with the dreams of world power. 'Germany Over All' is the motto which has poisoned the conscience of a majority of the German people in the age of imperialist war. And the German regiments loyal to this motto, in confidently following the principles of their doctrine, in a destructive wave flooded onto the plains of Belgium in 1914."[9]

An analogous picture can also be observed, in truth, in a less "total" variation in the other major imperialist states. The military contributed a good deal to creating a true bacchanalia of chauvinism and mutual hate, while the politicians intended to reap its fruits for their own purposes. In conducting more intense preparations for war, Germany outstripped its rivals in the technical equipping of the army as defined by the requirements of strategy. For this reason, France and Russia, seeing their lag in the development of weapons and armed forces as a whole, adopted new extensive armament programs.

But significant time was needed to carry them out.

The German military, in considering the preparations for war to be complete, began to work intensely to accelerate the outbreak of war. In the book published in 1913 entitled "Germany and the Future War," Gen Bernhardi expressed its aspirations in writing: "We should...constantly realize that under no circumstances should we avoid a war for our status as a world power and the task is not to put it off as long as possible but, on the contrary, to start it under the best conditions."[10] In endeavoring to accelerate the starting of a war in accord with its military-political and strategic assessment of the situation in the world, the German leadership literally provoked it. Thus, Kaiser Wilhelm in the margin of a report from Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg on the conflict situation in the Balkans, made a note that ultimately a provocation would be needed to obtain an opportunity to make an attack and that with adroit diplomacy and a cleverly controlled press it would be possible to create this provocation and hold it in constant readiness.

In characterizing the choice by Germany of the moment for initiating a war, V. I. Lenin wrote that it found "the most convenient, from its viewpoint, moment for the war, employing its last advancements in military equipment and anticipating the new weapons already planned and undertaken by Russia and France."[11]

The role of strategy in the preparations for World War I is most clearly seen from the example of Germany. This role was analogously apparent also in the preparations of the other imperialist powers.

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It is essential to point out that in turn strategy was constantly influenced by politics and the economy in the course of war preparations. This was reflected primarily in strategic planning. For example, the successor of von Schlieffen in the post of chief of the German Staff, von Moltke the Younger, under the pressure of the Ruhr industrialists and Prussian Junkers strengthened the German troop grouping on the left wing of the Western Front and in East Prussia, having weakened it in the sector of the main thrust. As a result, in the sector of this thrust against France, it was possible to create only a 3-fold superority instead of a 7-fold one and this was one of the reasons for the collapse of Germany's strategic plans.

As a whole, the role of strategy on the eve of the war was noticeably broadened and intensified. Undoubtedly this was one of the elements in the overall militarization of all aspects of social life in the imperialist states. However, during that period the role of strategy was not yet fully apparent in a number of problems and primarily in the area of the military-economic preparations of the states. Previously we have already mentioned the mistake of the German and other general staffs in determining the duration of the war. This was also reflected in the creation of mobilization reserves. The weapons and ammunition which the leading capitalist nations had at the start of the war were sufficient only for several months. For example, the French General Staff set the mobilization supply of artillery shells at approximately 6.5 million units while actually 305 million were expended.[12] This was the price of just one miscalculation by strategy in the area of the preparation of the states for the war.

Prior to World War II, all the actual data and the theoretical views on the problem of the preparation of nations for World War I were carefully studied and analyzed. For example, it was recognized that one of the reasons for serious miscalculations in the military-economic preparations was the lack of special bodies which would plan, organize and direct such preparations. In Germany the question was even raised of creating a special economic General Staff.

Although after World War I and particularly as a result of the victory of Great October, imperialism began to fear mass armies and because of this various theories about small professional armies became somewhat widespread, in official military policy of the major imperialist states, however, the emphasis was put on creating mass armed forces and preparing a large group of reservists who could be called up into the Army and Navy on the eve of or immediately with the start of a war.

The Communist Party, in steadily carrying out a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, was forced to adopt the necessary measures to ensuring the secure defense capability of our motherland and for complete preparations of the Soviet state for a future war in the event that the imperialists would start it. The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, has emphasized that "our party anticipated the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism and prepared the nation and people for defense. The socioeconomic victories of the prewar five-year plans and the ideological-political unity of

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Soviet society forged in the course of building socialism put down the foundations for the victory won by our people during the Great Patriotic War."[13]

Soviet military strategy played an essential role in preparing our nation for World War II in which Nazi Germany acted at the attack force of world imperialism. As a whole, Soviet strategy correctly defined the nature and scale of the coming military conflict, the particular features of conducting military operations, the role and relationship of the economic, moral-political and specifically military factors, the basic directions of military organizational development and so forth. Fundamental for it were Lenin's ideas on the nature of the war and on the close link between the military organization of a nation and its entire economic and cultural system and the Leninist principles of the organizational development of the Armed Forces including the most important of them, the total control of this organizational development and the entire question of strengthening the state's defense capability by the Communist Party.

In relying on these Leninist theses, in their works and practical activities M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, B. M. Shaposhnikov, V. K. Triandafillov and others devoted great attention to the problem of the preparation of the USSR for war. For example, M. N. Tukhachevskiy emphasized: "Each army should correspond to the economic capabilities of a nation, for only on these capabilities can it actually deploy its combat force and achieve those combat results which politics demands from strategy."[14]

Among the works devoted to the problem of the nation's preparations for war, a special place is held by the work of M. V. Frunze entitled "Front i tyl v voyne budushchego" [The Front and Rear in a Future War] published in 1925. In it the outstanding Soviet military leader and theoretician wrote: "The basic and most important conclusion from the experience of the last imperialist war of 1914-1918 is the reassessment of the question of the role and importance of the rear in the general course of military operations." He drew attention to the fact that the inevitability of a revision in the very principles of strategy stemmed from the changes in the nature of warfare. With a clash of first-rate enemies, a victory cannot be achieved by a single blow. The war will assume the nature of an extended and fierce contest which tests all the economic and political underpinnings of the belligerents. In such a war, the rear now is combined with the front. Hence, the new tasks and new methods for preparing national defense. In emphasizing that the task of preparing the nation for defense under present-day conditions extends far beyond the available capabilities of the army and the military department alone, he set as an imperative, vital and essential task "the organizing of the nation even in peacetime so that it could be quickly, easily and painlessly shifted to a wartime footing."[15]

Soviet military theory in a fundamentally correct manner also defined the role and place of the superior military control bodies in the preparation of the nation for war. In the work "Mozg Armii" [The Brain of the Army], B. M. Shaposhnikov, in drawing attention to the fact that the General Staff should hold an appropriate place in the control of the war and in the preparations for it, wrote: **"Generally and as a whole, not the General Staff, but rather the government of a state prepares for a war, conducts it and bears responsibility for its success or failure....** As for the General Staff, it through its

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representatives in the **"combat bodies"** in charge of the preparations for the war on various fronts, should be informed of their work, it must make various proposals in the sense of best satisfying operational needs but not be dictatorial, remembering that...the overstraining of a state's economic force is fraught with the threat of losing the war, no matter how brilliant the battlefield victories might be."[16]

Soviet military theory, in emphasizing the dependence of strategy upon the economy, has always also considered its reverse influence, that is, the role of the effect of Armed forces development on the economy. Even F. Engels drew attention to the fact that the army itself plays an important role in economic development. This thesis has been concretized and developed by Soviet military science in terms of the new historical conditions and has been practically realized in Soviet military organizational development.

Thus, military strategy, in posing demands in terms of the quantity and quality of the means of armed combat, substantially influences the volume and scientific-technical level of industrial production, as well as the development of transportation and the means of control. In addition, as the experience of both world wars has shown, it should, and rather accurately, determine the needs of the armed forces for materiel as well as the possible volume of its consumption, losses and so forth. The role of strategy becomes evermore essential in organizing the defense of the economy against armed actions by the enemy.

The experience of World War II fully confirmed the fundamental provisions of Soviet military doctrine on the problem of preparing the nation for war.

In the interwar period, the given problem became one of the central ones as well for bourgeois military theory and the practical preparation for a new world war by the major imperialist states. The importance of this for bourgeois military theory was determined by the fact that the preparations for a new world war by the imperialist powers were carried out on a significantly broader scale than previously as well as on a quantitatively and qualitatively different technical and material basis. Naturally, for each nation the basic directions, scale, nature and specific content of the preparatory measures were determined by their political goals.

For the British Empire, according to the assertion of the well-known English military theoretician Fuller, the immediate strategic tasks were "the conduct of small wars and the maintaining of calm in the nations which were backward in military and political terms (that is, the colonies.--L. K.)."[17] For Germany, immediately after the defeat in World War I, the question of revanche became fundamental. And with the coming of Hitler to power, the goal of winning world domination was turned from a remote prospect into the immediate main political task. But in the preparations of all the imperialist powers for a world war, there was also a fundamentally new factor namely the desire to destroy the Soviet Union by common efforts. Nazi Germany as well as militaristic Japan were chosen by imperialism as the main assault forces for carrying out this task. This played a bitter joke on a number of imperialist states, primarily France and England. Although they had spent colossal amounts and

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